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CRITICAL POINT IN THE DISABILITIES
MOVEMENT: HOW WILL TENNESSEE V.
LANE AFFECT CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER
TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT?
PETER J. MOLESSOt

INTRODUCTION

The rights of nearly 50 million Americans living with a
disability are in jeopardy.'
Congress sought to safeguard the
rights of disabled individuals with the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 2 One of the Act's major goals
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2003,
Hofstra University.
1 The 2000 U.S. Census estimated the number of Americans living with a
disability to be 49.7 million. JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-17.pdf. The Census Bureau asked two questions to produce
this figure. See U.S. Census Bureau, Definition of Disability Items in Census 2000,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/disdef00.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005). The first asked persons ages five and older whether they suffered from
any of "the following long-lasting conditions: (a) blindness, deafness, or a severe
vision or hearing impairment, (sensory disability) and (b) a condition that
substantially limits one or more basic physical activities such as walking, climbing
stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying (physical disability)." Id. The second question
asked persons ages five and older whether they had difficulty "(a) learning,
remembering, or concentrating (mental disability); (b) dressing, bathing, or getting
around inside the home (self-care disability);" and also asked persons ages 16 and
older if they had difficulty "(c) going outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor's
office (going outside the home disability); and (d) working at a job or business
(employment disability)." Id. A person was deemed "disabled" if they (1) were age
five or older and identified themselves as having either a "sensory, physical, mental,
or self-care disability;" (2) were age sixteen or older and identified themselves as
having a "going outside the home disability;" or (3) were between the ages of sixteen
and sixty-four and identified themselves as having an "employment disability." Id.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2000).
How one defines the term "disability" is of great importance, and can affect
statistical outcomes. See Peter Blanck, Justice for All? Stories About Americans with
Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 28 (2004)
("[E]mployment rates of persons with disabilities have varied positively and
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was to ensure that persons with disabilities received equal access
to public services and programs. 3 This right was codified in Title
II of the ADA. 4 A recent Supreme Court decision, however,
seems to pave the way for the Court to hold in future decisions
that Congress overstepped its bounds by creating a general right
to sue States under Title II. In Tennessee v. Lane,5 the Court
found that Title II claims for money damages were not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment's state immunity doctrine. 6 The Court
limited its holding, however, to apply only to instances where
persons with disabilities are denied access to the courts. 7 The
Supreme Court declined to address whether all claims brought
under Title II would survive state immunity challenges. 8 The
Court's narrow holding is significant because in Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,9 decided a few
years prior to Lane, it held that claims for money damages
brought under Title 1,10 which addresses employment
discrimination, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.1 1
negatively, depending on how disability is defined and measured."); Robert F. Rich
et al., Critical Legal and Policy Issues for People with Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 1, 3 (2002) ("Slight variations in the definition of disability can
mean a difference of millions of potentially eligible people with disabilities using
billions of dollars in programs and services."). The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). It is interesting to note that
the 2000 U.S. Census appears to have based its figure using a different definition of
the term "disability." See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPROVING FEDERAL
DISABILITY DATA 9 (2004), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
2004/pdf/improvedata.pdf (recommending that "[t]he U.S. Census Bureau...
immediately revise Census questions for the Year 2010 Census . . . to reflect the
ADA definition").
The ADA does not define any of the terms used in its definition of disability. See
Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Introductionfor Lawyers
and Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 175, 181 (1994). Definitions for such terms
can be found in the rules of the various agencies charged with enforcing the ADA.
See id. For a detailed examination of how the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Department of Justice interpret "physical or mental
impairment" and "major life activity," see id. at 182-83.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
4 See id. §§ 12131-12165.
5 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
6 See id. at 533-34.
7 See id. at 531.
8 See id. at 530-31.
9 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
11 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.
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Analyzed within the context of Garrett, it appears that the
Court's holding in Lane severely limits the rights of persons with
disabilities. After Lane, it seems as if the only claims based on
Title II's remedial provisions that can withstand a state
immunity challenge are those that simultaneously allege a
violation of a fundamental right, and thus trigger strict scrutiny

review. 12
This Note seeks to examine the rights of disabled individuals
after Lane. Part I provides a historical perspective of the rights
of disabled Americans with an emphasis on the dramatic
progress of the disabilities movement in the last half-century.
Part II gives a concise overview of the ADA itself and offers a
more detailed look at Titles I and II, as both are relevant for a
complete analysis of Lane. Part III examines the Court's decision
in Lane within the framework of its current stance on States'
rights. Part IV suggests that the existence of a fundamental
right, invoking strict scrutiny review, was necessary to Lane's
holding. It then surveys some recent lower court decisions
addressing the issue. Part V briefly discusses the extent to
which the ADA is able to remedy discrimination against disabled
Americans today. Finally, this Note interprets the holding of
Lane to apply to all violations of fundamental rights, and
concludes that Title II claims that fail to allege the violation of a
fundamental right, and are thus decided under rational basis
review, will not survive a state immunity challenge.

I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHTS
OF DISABLED AMERICANS

Persons with
discrimination. 13

disabilities have long been subject to
Throughout most of American history,

12 It is important to note the distinction between claims based on the remedial
provisions of the ADA and those alleging direct violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Recently, in United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006), the
Supreme Court held that States could be subject to suit under Title II of the ADA
because Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to create "private
remedies against the States for actual violations" of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 881. This differs from Congress's power to create remedial legislation pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment that permits individuals to bring suits against States.
See id. The legislation at issue in Lane and Garrett falls into this latter category,
which is the subject of considerable constitutional debate. See id. ("[Tihe members of
this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress' 'prophylactic'
enforcement powers under [Section 5] of the Fourteenth Amendment .... ).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (finding that "historically, society has tended to
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legislation that sought to address the rights of disabled
Americans was scarce. 14 Then, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
there emerged a disabilities movement that took up such a
cause. 15 The culmination of this movement came in 1990 with
16
Congress's passage of the ADA.
Society has traditionally viewed disabled individuals as
incompetent and burdensome. 17 A popular response in the early
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities").
14 See STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 49
(1989) (stating that in the late 1960s policies addressing the disabled shifted from
"services and income supports" to "rights and protections").
15 See id.
16 See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 387-91 (1991) (discussing the history of the
ADA and its relation to the disabled rights movement and previous disabled rights
legislation).
17 See Barbara P. lanacone, Historical Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50
TEMP. L. Q. 953, 953-54 (1977). This perception was inherited from English social
policy that persisted since the seventeenth century. See id. at 953 & n.4 (stating that
American perceptions of the disabled were influenced by the English Poor Law
system, which viewed the disabled as the government's responsibility).
Prejudice against the disabled went far beyond notions of inferiority. In the midnineteenth century, the disabled were widely held as "evolutionary laggards or
throwbacks." See Douglas C. Baynton, Disability and the Justification of Inequality
in American History, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 33,
36 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001) ("Physical or mental
abnormalities were commonly depicted as instances of atavism, reversions to earlier
stages of evolutionary development."). A disturbing illustration of this belief is seen
in nineteenth-century "freak shows" that exhibited persons with disabilities as "lessevolved creatures from far off jungles." See id. at 40.
The use of an "evolutionary hierarchy" was also used to justify discrimination
against racial minorities. See id. at 36, 40. As such, discrimination against persons
with disabilities and racism were interrelated. See id. For example, Down syndrome
was first termed 'Mongolism," because it was "believed... to be the result of a
biological reversion by Caucasians to the Mongol racial type." See id. at 36. The
parallels between race and disability discrimination can been seen throughout
American history. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The
Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 404-05 (1991).
The xenophobic hysteria around the turn of the century, dressed in the
power of state authority, focused pervasively against racial minorities
(especially black Americans) as well as persons with disabilities. Both
groups were seen as unfit, and therefore, official action imposed mandatory
exclusion and segregation upon both groups. Government-supported
segregation of African-Americans and persons with disabilities evoked,
reinforced, and legitimated public and private prejudices and the actions
based on those prejudices ....

The solution for the then-recognized "common problem" was precisely
similar: state imposed segregation of "the Negro" and persons with
disabilities.
Id. at 404-05 (footnotes omitted).
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decades of the nation's history was to segregate persons with
disabilities by putting them away in almshouses.' 8 The harshest
treatment against disabled Americans, however, took place
within the last hundred years. With the rise of Social Darwinism
and the eugenics movement near the turn of the twentieth
century, States began implementing policies of mandatory
Thus,
sterilization and isolation of disabled individuals. 19
throughout most of American history, persons with disabilities
were subject to severe forms of abuse and discrimination.
Social policy reflecting the interests of disabled Americans
was almost nonexistent before the twentieth century. 20 The first
programs of such kind focused on the needs of the disabled but
did little to promote their rights. 2' These policy initiatives
18 See lanacone, supra note 17, at 954 (stating that almshouses were the
"institutional panacea for the maintenance of the dependant"). The use of
almshouses as places to keep persons with disabilities was most popular in the first
half of the nineteenth century. See id. at 954 n.7. During this period, most of the
States "had either encouraged or made mandatory the creation of almshouses." See
id.
19 See Cook, supra note 17, at 399-400. By 1938, thirty-three States had
sterilization statutes. See David Pfeiffer, Overview of the Disability Movement:
History, Legislative Record, and PoliticalImplications, 21 POLY STUD. J. 724, 726
(1993). Such legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207-08 (1927). At issue in Buck was a Virginia statute that allowed for "the
sterilization of mental defectives." See id. at 205. The plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was an
eighteen-year-old woman committed to a Virginia institution and ordered to undergo
sterilization against her will. See id. The Court found that the statute was a
constitutional exercise of state power as it promoted the general welfare of the
public. See id. at 207. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes announced that the
sterilization of such "imbeciles" was warranted as:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon its best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those
who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often
not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.
Id. at 207. Although the statute at issue in Buck was eventually repealed in 1968,
sterilizations continued until 1972. Pfeiffer, supra, at 726.
20 See PERCY, supra note 14, at 9 ("With the exception of schools for
handicapped children, particularly those serving hearing- and sight-impaired
students, and the creation of public institutions providing custodial care, public
policy efforts on behalf of persons with disabilities have largely taken place during
this century.").
21 See id. at 9-10, 49. This paradigm has been coined "the medical model." See
Blanck, supra note 2, at 3. Its roots date back to the Civil War, when injured soldiers
received compensation for their inability to work. See id.
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consisted of vocational, rehabilitative, and income support
programs. 22 Although the rehabilitative programs did attempt to
bring persons with disabilities into society, they were aimed at
making the disabled "adjust to a society structured around the
convenience and interests of the nondisabled." 23 In response, a
political movement that sought to address the rights of disabled
24
Americans was formed.
The disabilities movement of the 1960s and 1970s focused on
integrating disabled individuals into society. 25 Persons with
disabilities had traditionally been thought of as inferior citizens
and burdensome on the rest of the population, 26 so the movement
sought an "attitudinal change." 27 Its efforts were directed at
showing the public that disabled individuals could be productive
members of society. 28 The movement resulted in many advances
for the rights of disabled Americans, including legislation
addressing architectural barriers and discrimination on the basis
29
of disability.
22 See PERCY, supra note 14, at 9-10, 44-45; Blanck, supra note 2, at 3. In 1918,

the Smith-Sears Veterans' Rehabilitation Act was enacted to "vocationally
rehabilitate disabled veterans." See PERCY, supra note 14, at 44. Two years later in
1920, the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act was passed. See id. This marked
"the first broad-based federal program to provide vocational assistance" to the
disabled. Id. Income support programs developed near the middle of the century. In
1956, Social Security Disability Insurance provided "a system of disability
payments.., for workers between the ages of fifty and sixty-four." Id. at 45. A more
expansive income support program, Supplemental Security Income, was enacted in
1972. See id. at 46. Under this program, disabled individuals received benefits based
on "needs." See id.
23 See Blanck, supra note 2, at 3. Although such programs were enacted for the
benefit of disabled persons, under them the existence of a disability "precluded equal
participation in society." See id.
24 See PERCY, supra note 14, at 49. ("By the late 1960s, the direction of public
policies to assist persons with mental or physical disabilities began to take a new
direction, one that focused more on rights and protections than on services and
income supports.").
25 See id. (stating that policy goals of the 1960s and 1970s were aimed at
eliminating "physical and social barriers that restrict the access of disabled persons
to mainstream society").
26 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the history of society's
negative perception of individuals with disabilities).
27 See PERCY, supra note 14, at 48 ("Advocates saw the need for an attitudinal
change, whereby persons with disabilities would be viewed as individuals with a
wide set of abilities as well as one or more physical or mental impairments.").
28 See id. (discussing the need for persons with disabilities to be viewed as
"individuals with a wide set of abilities").
29 See id. at 49-62. The most noteworthy of these laws are the Architectural
Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (2000), and the Rehabilitation Act of
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Despite the many successes of the disabilities movement,
persons with disabilities were not fully protected from
discrimination in the areas of employment and public services,
and there remained a negative stigma that accompanied
disability. 30 To address these issues, Congress authorized the
National Council on the Handicapped (the "Council"), 31 an
independent federal agency, to "review all federal laws and
programs that affected individuals with disabilities." 32 In its
report to the President and Congress in 1986, entitled Towards
Independence, the Council made a specific recommendation for a
"comprehensive law requitting [sic] equal opportunity for
individuals with disabilities." 33 Such a law came in the form of
34
the ADA.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of

1973. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of title 29 of the United States Code).
30 See Weicker, supra note 16, at 389 ("Despite the myriad of civil rights
legislation on the books, people with disabilities remained unprotected in many
contexts in which federal laws prohibited other types of discrimination-private
employment, public accommodations, transportation, and state and local activities
and services."); cf. Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: What it
Means to All Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 377 (1991) ("The ADA overcomes our
past failure to eliminate attitudinal, architectural, and communication barriers in
employment, transportation, public accommodations, public services, and
telecommunications."). One proposal to combat these gaps in disabilities rights
legislation called for an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include
disabled persons as a protected group. See Weicker, supra note 16, at 389. No such
action was ever taken, however. See id.
31 Today, the Council's authorizing statute names the agency as the National
Council on Disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 780 (2000).
32 Weicker, supra note 16, at 389-90. The Council was originally part of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. at 389. In 1984, Congress
reestablished the Council as an independent federal agency. See id. at 389-90.

33 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

11 (1986),

available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1986/pdf/toward.pdf.
Additionally, the Council found that "[flederal disability programs reflect[ed] an
overemphasis on income support and an underemphasis of initiatives for equal
opportunity, independence, prevention, and self-sufficiency." See id. at 7. It also
recommended that "[miore emphasis ... be given to [flederal programs encouraging
and assisting private sector efforts to promote opportunities and independence for
individuals with disabilities." See id. at 8.
34 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 35 The Act
seeks to combat the "major areas of discrimination faced day-today by people with disabilities." 36 The Act's legislative findings
identify such "critical areas" as "employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and
38
access to public services." 37 Thus, the Act's scope is quite broad.
The focus of this discussion is on Title II and Title I of the ADA.
Although Lane only addressed the constitutionality of Title II,39 a
proper analysis of the Court's decision requires knowledge of the
protections of both Titles.
Title II pertains to the denial of public services and programs
on the basis of disability. 40 Title II covers the services and
programs of state and local governments 41 and their
42
"instrumentalit[ies]," including departments and agencies.

35 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
36 Id.
§ 12101(b)(4).
37 Id. § 12101(a)(3).
38 The Act's significance can be attributed to its enormous breadth. See Mullen,
supranote 2, at 179 (stating that the ADA "has been described as the 'Emancipation
Proclamation' for people with disabilities, the most comprehensive federal civil
rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 'the most sweeping piece of
civil rights legislation since the Civil War era'" (citing Hearingson H.R. 2273 before
the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of
the Comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R.,
101st Cong. 201-12 (1989); Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings before
the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped
on S. 9333, U.S. S., 101st Cong. 500 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. 14, 19801 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Harkin); 135 CONG REC. 14, 19804 (1989) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)).
39 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II's predecessor, section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, addressed discrimination by public services, but it applied to only those
programs and services receiving federal funds. See Marc Charmatz & Antoinette
McRae, Access to the Courts: A Blueprint for Successful Litigation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, 3 MARGINS 333, 337
(2003). Title II applies to the state programs regardless of whether they are federally
funded. See id. But see Cook, supra note 17, at 417 (stating that the purpose of the
ADA was not to extend coverage, as "the vast majority of governmental entities in
this country were already subject to section 504 as recipients of federal assistance"
and that "the problem was the mandate [of section 504] and the standards for
enforcing that mandate").
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A).
42 See id. § 12131(1)(B). "Essentially, everything that these public entities do or
are involved with is addressed." Mullen, supra note 2, at 196.
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Those protected under Title II are disabled individuals who are
43
eligible to receive such services.
Title I is directed at employment discrimination against the
disabled. 44 The statute protects any "qualified individual with a
disability," defined as any person who can successfully fulfill the
tasks required of the position they either hold or are seeking to
fill. 45 An employer cannot deny employment to an applicant
because the hiring would require the employer to bear the costs
of such accommodations. 46 The statute does exempt employers,
however, if they demonstrate "undue hardship." 47 There are a
number of factors to consider when determining whether an
accommodation creates an undue hardship. 48
These factors
include the cost of the accommodation, the financial resources of
the facility or employer, the size of the employer, and the type of
49
work involved.
Titles I and II clearly serve different purposes, as each seeks
to address different forms of discrimination against the disabled.
One aspect of the ADA that Congress intended Title I and II (and
all sections of the ADA) to share was their applicability to
discrimination by the States. 50 The statute expressly provides
that "State[s] shall not be immune under the [Elleventh
[A]mendment... for a violation" of its provisions. 5 1 The issue as
to whether Congress had such power has been the subject of
constitutional debate, and constitutes the remainder of this
Note's discussion.
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

44 See id. § 12112(a). Title I applies not only to hiring but "job application
procedures.... advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. Prior to its
enactment, federal laws only protected persons working for the federal government.
See Thornburgh, supra note 30, at 377 ("Without the ADA, federal law would
continue to provide no protection against discrimination for most individuals with
disabilities working outside the federal government."). Discrimination by an
employer or prospective employer includes, among other practices, classifying on the
basis of disability "in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status" of
those protected under that statute, "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or
benefits" to the disabled, and failing to make "reasonable accommodations" for a
qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(1), 12112(b)(4), 12112 (b)(5)(A).
45 See id. § 12111(8).
46 See id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
47 See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
48 See id. § 12111(10)(B).
49 See id.
50 See id. § 12202.

51 See id.
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III.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE ADA:
TENNESSEE V. LANE AND THE ROAD TO ITS DECISION

In the past decade, the Supreme Court has handed down a
number of decisions reaffirming state immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 52 The ADA has itself been the subject of
such litigation. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett, the Court held that States were immune from claims
for money damages brought under Title 1. 53 Three years later, in
Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar
challenge to Title 11. 54 This Part examines the Supreme Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and its influence in Garrett.
It then discusses the factual background of Lane, and explores
the Lane Court's analysis of an Eleventh Amendment challenge
to Title II of the ADA.
A. The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudenceand
the ADA
The Eleventh Amendment grants immunity to the States for
55
unconsented suits brought by citizens from another State.
Supreme Court case law has also repeatedly interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment to hold States immune from suits brought
by their own citizens. 56 Such state immunity can be abrogated by

52 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding States
immune from suits brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) ("[T]he powers delegated to
Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power
to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999) (holding States immune from suits brought under the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding States immune from suits brought under the
Patent Remedy Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding
States immune from suits under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
53 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
54 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004).
55 Read literally, the Eleventh Amendment only applies to "suit[s] in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
56 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 517 ("Even though the Amendment 'by its
terms... applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State,' our cases
have repeatedly held that this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought
by a State's own citizens." (citing Garrett,531 U.S. at 363; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72-73)
(omission in original)).
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Congress, however, if it satisfies a two-pronged test. 57 First,
Congress must "unequivocally expresso its intent to abrogate
[state] immunity."5 8 Second, Congress must act "pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority," 59 or within the bounds of
its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 0 The
first prong of the test is met when a statute under review
explicitly provides that States are not immune from its
provisions. 61
The second prong is met when that statute
"exhibits 'a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' "62
This second prong can best be understood as a three step
analysis. The first step is to identify the constitutional right
sought to be protected by Congress and the level of review
afforded to such a right. 63 The second step is to look at the
57 See id. at 517 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73).
68 Id.

59 Id.
60 See id. at 518 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). Section 5

gives Congress the power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause "by enacting
'appropriate legislation.'" See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (citing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)). The power of Congress to abrogate state immunity
was not always confined to its Section 5 powers. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court announced that abrogation of state immunity could be
based on either Congress's power under Section 5 or the Commerce Clause. See id.
at 19. This decision, however, was overruled in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996), where the Court held that Congress could not rely on any of its
powers enumerated in Article I to abrogate state immunity. See id. at 72.
61 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 517-18 (finding an intention to abrogate state
immunity once a statute explicitly provides for a State not to be immune); Garrett,
531 U.S. at 363-64 (finding no dispute as to whether there was an intention to
abrogate state immunity because of statute's explicit language).
62 Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
63 See id. at 522; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. At this point the Court must
ascertain what level of scrutiny is required: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or
rational basis review.
Under strict scrutiny, a State's action will be upheld only if it is "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 748
(2000). Strict scrutiny applies when a state law draws classifications based on race,
alienage, or national origin, or infringes upon a fundamental right. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Supreme Court
has identified as fundamental rights the right to access the courts, the right to vote,
and the right of interstate travel. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34; McDonald v. Bd. of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-09 (1969), aff'd, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
The intermediate level of scrutiny applies to discrimination based on "quasisuspect" classifications. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 446. The most commonly
cited example of a classification subject to this form of review is classification on the
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statute's legislative record to determine whether there is a
"history and pattern" of unconstitutional behavior. 64 In the last
step of the analysis, a court must ensure that the remedy
provided by the statute is "an appropriate response to this
history and pattern of unequal treatment."65 The Court first
applied this analysis to the ADA in Garrett.
At issue in Garrett was whether Congress had validly
66
abrogated state immunity with respect to Title I of the ADA.
The Court began its analysis by noting that Congress had clearly
intended to abrogate state immunity, thus satisfying the first
prong of the test. 67 The Court then turned to step one of the
congruence
and
proportionality
analysis,
finding
the
constitutional right protected under Title I to be the equal
treatment of persons with disabilities. 68 As such, the scope of
this protection was limited to rational basis review, meaning that
States can discriminate against disabled individuals if there is a
rational relationship between such disparate treatment and
"some legitimate government purpose."69
basis of gender. See id. at 441 (citing Miss. Univ. v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 721 (1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Under this form of review, a State's
classification is upheld only if it is "'substantially related to a legitimate state
interest.'" Id. (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational basis review. See id. at 439-40. State laws

subject to this form of review are presumed valid and will be upheld if they are
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest." See id. at 440. Laws commonly
held to this standard are those addressing social or economic issues. See id.
64 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523-25, 530; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
65 Lane, 541 U.S. at 530; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
66 See Garrett,531 U.S. at 360. Garrett involved two consolidated claims against
the State of Alabama for employment discrimination. See id. at 362-63. One plaintiff
alleged that she was not permitted to continue as Director of Nursing at the
University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital because she took leave to seek
cancer treatment. See id. at 362. The other claimed that the Alabama Department of
Youth Services failed to alter his work schedule and duties to accommodate his
chronic asthma and sleep apnea. See id.
67 See id. at 363-64 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000)).
68 See id. at 365; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 522 (stating that in Garrett the
Court "identified Title I's purpose as enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's
command that 'all persons similarly situated should be treated alike'" (quoting
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439)).
69 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993)); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 522 (reaffirming that "classifications based on
disability violate [the Fourteenth Amendment] if they lack a rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental purpose").
The Court first announced that discrimination against the disabled was subject
to rational basis review in Cleburne. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. The Court gave a
number of reasons for its conclusion. First, given the wide range of persons that fall
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Turning to step two in the analysis, after examining the
legislative record of the ADA, the Court found that Congress had
failed to "identify a pattern of irrational [S]tate discrimination in
employment against the disabled." 70 The Court noted at the
outset that it would not rely on instances of discrimination
against persons with disabilities by local governments because
the issue of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment only
applies to the States. 71 Looking at the record of employment
discrimination by state actors, the Court found that Congress
72
had only assembled "minimal evidence" of such discrimination.
Additionally, the Court noted that Congress failed to specifically
address employment discrimination by the States in the ADA's
73
legislative findings.
Although the Court could have ended its inquiry here, it
went on to address the third step in the analysis, stating that
even if there was a history and pattern of employment
discrimination by the States, the legislative response taken
would have been inappropriate. 74 According to the Court, the
statute's requirement that employers spend money on
accommodations went too far because it would be reasonable, and
thus constitutional, for an employer to refuse to hire a person

under the classification as having a disability, "from those whose disability is not
immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for," courts lack the
knowledge to make informed decisions pertaining to policies affecting the disabled.
See id. at 442-43. A decision as such should be left to the legislature. See id. Second,
because both the States and the federal government were addressing the "plight" of
the disabled "in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a
corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary," a higher standard
of review would not be warranted. See id. at 443. Third, given that the States and
the federal government have responded shows that the disabled are not "politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers." See id. at 445. Finally, if disabled individuals were classified as a quasisuspect class, the judiciary would have a hard time distinguishing "the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm." See id. at 445-46.
The plaintiffs prevailed despite the Court's application of rational basis review.
The Cleburne Court held that requiring a special use permit for a home for persons
with mental disabilities was based on an "irrational prejudice." See id. at 450.
70 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
71 See id. at 368-69. Local governments can be sued under the ADA "without
Congress' ever having to rely on [Section 5] of the Fourteenth Amendment to render
them so." See id.
72 See id. at 370.
73 See id. at 372.
74 See id.
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with a disability to avoid added costs. 75 As a consequence, the
Court held States immune from suits brought by citizens under
Title 1. 76 It should be noted that the Court's holding only applies
to claims brought by citizens against a State for money damages.
In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist added that the federal
government could still sue the States under the ADA for money
damages, and that private citizens could seek injunctive relief
against state officials.7 7 For example, a state employee fired on
the basis of disability can seek a court order forcing the State to
reinstate his job. The Court declined to address whether Title II
was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.78 Three years later, the Court was presented with
the opportunity to take up the issue in Lane.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that Title I
was an "appropriate" remedy for employment discrimination
against the disabled by the States. 79
Justice Breyer first
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that there was not ample
evidence of such discrimination.8 0 According to Justice Breyer,
the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans
with Disabilities' finding of numerous instances of discrimination
by state officials,8 1 and evidence of societal discrimination
against the disabled, "implicates" state governments because

See id.
[W]hereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a
state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees
who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to
"mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities." The ADA does except employers
from the "reasonable accommodatio[n]" requirement where the employer
"can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." However,
even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate
responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an
"undue burden" upon the employer.
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
76 See id. at 360.
75

77 See id. at 374 n.9
78 See id. at 360 n.1. Although the plaintiffs alleged violations of both Titles I
and II, they failed to brief the Court on Title II violations. See id. As such, the Court
dismissed the portion of the complaint pertaining to Title II. See id.
79 See id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80

See id. at 377-82.

81 See id. at 379.
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"state agencies form part of that same larger society."8 2 As to the
Court's application of the congruence and proportionality test,
of the test was too
Justice Breyer argued that the Court's use
83
harsh in that it failed to defer to Congress.
B. Tennessee v. Lane: An Eleventh Amendment Challenge to
Title II
The plaintiffs in Lane claimed that they were denied state
services on account of their disabilities.8 4 George Lane, who was
a paraplegic and had to use a wheelchair to get around,8 5 was
86
scheduled to go to court to answer a set of criminal charges.
The courthouse, however, did not have any elevators.8 7 To make
his appearance, Lane was forced to crawl up two flights of
stairs.8 8 When he was scheduled to make a second appearance,
Lane would not crawl up the stairs again, and refused to be
carried by a court officer.8 9 He was arrested for failing to
appear. 90 The second plaintiff, Beverly Jones, was a court
reporter and also a paraplegic. 91 Jones claimed that a number of
courthouses were inaccessible because of her disability. 9 2 The
district court denied the State's motion to dismiss. 93 The court of
appeals affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs alleged the
violation of a fundamental right, access to the courts. 94 The
95
Supreme Court affirmed.
As in Garrett, the Court noted that Congress had expressly
intended to abrogate state immunity. 96 It then applied the threestep analysis used in Garrett to determine whether Congress had
such power. Addressing step one, the Court found that Title II
was enacted, not only to guarantee the equal protection of
82
83

See id. at 378.
See id. at 387-89.

84 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004).
85

See id.

86 See id. at
87 See id.
88 See id. at
89 See id.

513-14.
514.

90 See id.
91 See id. at 513-14.
92

See id. at 514.

93 See id.
94 See id. at 514-15.
95 See id. at 534.
96

See id. at 517-18 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000)).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:693

persons with disabilities, but also to ensure "basic constitutional
guarantees." 97 At issue in Lane was the fundamental right of
access to the courts. 98 Consequently, the Court applied a higher
standard of review than it did in Garrett; discrimination would
only be upheld in the face of a compelling state interest. 99
Turning to step two, the Court found ample evidence of state
discrimination against persons with disabilities relating to
unequal access to the courts. 10 0 In addition, the Court stated
that it could rely on proof of discrimination by local governments
because when administering "judicial services" local governments
are treated as "'arm[s] of the State.'"101 Moreover, the Court
went beyond the limited facts of the case and noted the "sheer
volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of
unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities
in the provision of public services."'1 2 Finally, Congress listed in
the findings of the ADA itself the denial of "'access to public
97 See id. at 522. Some of these "basic constitutional guarantees" include the
right of access to the courts, the right of criminal defendants to be present at all
stages of a criminal trial, the right of civil litigants to be heard, the right of a
criminal defendant to have a fair jury trial, and the public's right of access to
criminal proceedings. See id. at 522-23.
98 See id. at 529.
99 See id. at 528-29, 532 (stating that because Title II applied to "a variety of
basic rights, including the right of access to the courts," its standard of review would
be "at least as searching, and in some cases more searching" than the intermediary
level of review).
100 See id. at 527.

Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across the
country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by
reason of their disabilities. A report before Congress showed that some 76%
of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were
inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities, even taking into
account the possibility that the services and programs might be
restructured or relocated to other parts of the buildings. Congress itself
heard testimony from persons with disabilities who described the physical
inaccessibility of local courthouses. And its appointed task force heard
numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state
judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons with visual
impairments and hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state
and local governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing
impaired, failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental
disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to
witnesses with physical disabilities.
Id. (citations omitted).
101 See id. at 527 n.16 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)) (alteration in original).
102 See id. at 528.
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services'" as a "'critical area[]'" of discrimination.1 0 3 The Court's
analysis then turned to the congruence and proportionality of

Title 11.104
In the final step of the analysis, addressing the
appropriateness of Title II, the Court stated that it only needed
to consider whether Title II was an appropriate response to the
denial of the rights at issue in the case before the Court. 10 5 The
Court found that Title II was an appropriate response to disabled
individuals being denied equal access to the courts given that the
problem "has persisted despite several legislative efforts to
remedy the problem of disability discrimination." 10 6 Further,
because the case dealt with a due process violation, the Court
stated that "ordinary considerations of cost and convenience
alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a
meaningful right of access to the courts." 10 7 As a result, the
Court held that Congress validly abrogated state immunity as a
response to the denial of the fundamental right of access to the
courts. 108
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the
1 9 According
Court's holding to be "irreconcilable with Garrett."'
103 See id. at 529 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000)).

104 See id. at 530-31.
105 See id. at 530 (stating that "nothing in our case law requires us to consider
Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole"). The
State argued that the protections afforded under Title II far exceeded that which
Congress could validly grant because they applied "not only to public education and
voting-booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks." Id. The Court
responded by stating that:
[T]he question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly
subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to provide
reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether
Congress had the power under [Section 5] to enforce the constitutional
right of access to the courts.
Id. at 530-31.
106 Id. at 531.
107 See id. at 532-33. It is important to note the Court's discussion of "ordinary
considerations of cost and convenience," as it signals that any argument founded on
a rational basis would not be sufficient to justify discrimination against the disabled
by denying them access to the courts.
108 See id. at 533-34.
109 See id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). A second dissent was filed by
Justice Scalia, who felt that the congruence and proportionality test was unworkable
and suggested "one that provides a clear, enforceable limitation supported by the
text of [Section 5]." See id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also filed a
dissent. Agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist, he reiterated his belief that Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), where the court
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to the Chief Justice, the Court failed to show "widespread
violations of the due process rights of disabled persons."1 1 0 Also,
it was an error on the part of the Court to consider evidence of
generalized societal discrimination and discrimination by local
governments.' 1 ' With respect to the Court's congruence and
proportionality test, the Chief Justice found that permitting
money damages to be sought against States under Title II was an
invalid exercise of congressional power because the Act's
provisions sought to correct discrimination to a greater extent
than the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 2 "Title II requires, on pain of
money damages, special accommodations for disabled persons in
virtually every interaction they have with the State."" 3 For that
14
reason, Congress had overstepped its bounds."
Chief Justice Rehnquist also took issue with the fact that the
Court sought to limit its holding to cases addressing access to the
courts." 5 The Chief Justice argued that "carv[ing] up" Title II to
apply only to the case at hand was inconsistent with previous
decisions addressing state immunity." 6 Rather, the Court's
analysis was not of Title II, but of some "hypothetical" statute
addressing "courthouses." 117 The Chief Justice went on to add
that even under the Court's limited analysis as applied to access
to the courts, there was still a lack of evidence showing state
discrimination, and the statute was overly broad, as States would
be held liable for "any sort of inconvenience in accessing" a
8
courthouse."1
IV. TITLE II AS A REMEDY AFTER LANE
After Lane, it is clear that claims brought under Title II will
prevail if they allege the violation of a fundamental right. This
sounds like a victory for the disabilities movement. The Court's

upheld Congress's abrogation of state immunity under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, was wrongly decided and he sought to "disavow any reliance" on
that case. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11oLane, 541 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 541-42.
112

See id. at 549.

113 Id.
115

See id. at 538.
See id. at 551.

116

See id.

117

See id.

114

11 See id. at 553 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)).
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language, however, puts a major limitation on Title II claims. In
order to prevail, the claimant relying on the Title II as remedial
legislation must allege the violation of a fundamental right. To
fully understand the extent of this limitation, it is necessary to
first compare Lane with Garrett, and then analyze how Lane may
impact the rights of disabled Americans.
A. ComparingLane with Garrett
In two separate decisions, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the Eleventh Amendment barred Title I and Title II
claims brought against the States for money damages.
In
Garrett, the Court found that Congress did not validly abrogate
state immunity under Title 1.119 In Lane, the Court found that,
in at least one circumstance, States were not immune from suits
brought under Title II.120 An explanation for these divergent
results appears to be based on two factors. First, Garrett was
decided under rational basis review, 121 whereas strict scrutiny
applied in Lane. 122 Second, there was more proof of the type of
state discrimination at issue in Lane than the type of
1 23
discrimination at issue in Garrett.
The Court's decision to apply different levels of scrutiny in
Garrett and Lane seems to have greatly affected the outcomes in
both cases.1 24 As only rational basis review applied in Garrett,
any instance of discrimination against disabled individuals would
be constitutional if it served a "'legitimate governmental
purpose.' 125 Therefore, if a state employer failed to hire a
disabled individual on the ground that doing so would require
making structural changes at a high cost, the employer's actions
would not violate the Equal Protection Clause because a
See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-73, 100-04 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Timothy J. Cahill & Betsy
Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An 'As Applied" Saving Construction
for the ADA's Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 163 (2004) (stating that the
Supreme Court could find a valid abrogation of state immunity in Lane because,
unlike the Title I analysis in Garrett, Title II addresses fundamental rights). For a
remarkably accurate prediction as to how the Court could decide Lane, see Cahill &
Malloy, supra.
125 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
119
120
121
122
123
124
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legitimate government purpose, saving money, would have been
served.126 Since Lane addressed the violation of a fundamental
right, state conduct would not be constitutional if founded on a
mere rational basis. 127 Subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, a
State's denial of a fundamental right to persons with disabilities
28
could only be justified by serving a compelling state interest. 1
Another possible factor that contributed to the different
outcomes in Garrett and Lane was the amount of evidence
available in each case showing a history and pattern of state
discrimination. 129 In Garrett, the Court found that the ADA's
legislative record failed to show that there was sufficient
evidence of discrimination against the disabled in the area of
employment. 30 The Court noted that much of the record before
Congress pertained to "discrimination by the States in the
provision of public services and public accommodations.''
Similarly, in Lane the Court used such evidence to support its
finding of a history and pattern of discrimination as it related to
the provisions of Title 11.132 Moreover, whereas in Garrett the
Court refused to consider evidence of discrimination by local
governments, 33 the Lane Court relied on such proof to find a
history and pattern of discrimination. 1 34 Furthermore, the ADA's
legislative findings stated that discrimination by the States in
the denial of public services and programs was a concern, 135 but
failed to make any such declaration with regard to employment
discrimination. 136 In sum, different levels of scrutiny and the
126 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 63.
128 See supra note 63.
129 Cf. Cahill & Malloy, supra note 124, at 167 (stating that Title II "may not
meet the same fate" as Title I "[b]ecause the legislative record in support of Title II

appears to be more substantial than that for Title I").
130 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
131 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371 n.7
(2001). Equal access to public accommodations is addressed in Title III of the ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
132 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 526 (2004). It should be noted that in
Garrett, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found such evidence to be
unreliable as it was anecdotal and was "submitted not directly to Congress but to the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities." See
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71.
133 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Court's differing interpretations of the ADA's legislative record
appear to account for the different outcomes in Garrett and Lane.
B. The Reach of Lane's Holding
Whereas the holding in Garrett, that suits brought against
the States under Title I for money damages are "barred by the
Eleventh Amendment," 137 cannot be subject to interpretation, it
is not as clear whether the same can be said for Lane. The Court
upheld Title II, but limited its holding to the denial of access to
the courts. This decision appears to have been heavily influenced
138
by the existence of a violation of a fundamental right.
It is suggested here that Lane indicates that suits brought
under Title II against a State for money damages will be
successful if the claimant can show the violation of a
fundamental right. The reasons are twofold. First, the violation
139
of a fundamental right will trigger strict scrutiny analysis.
Thus, if a claim speaks in terms of fundamental rights, the Court
is going to give far less deference to the States. 140 Second, and
logically related, the Supreme Court will find a valid abrogation
of state immunity when it applies a standard of review higher
than rational basis.14 1 This is to say that under a strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court will find that remedial legislation passed
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is congruent
and proportional to the history and pattern of the discrimination
it seeks to remedy. Such a proposition is consistent with a
Garrett,531 U.S. at 360.
See Cahill & Malloy, supra note 124, at 139 (stating that the plaintiffs in
Lane were likely to be successful "because the Lane case involve[d] a fundamental
right").
139 See supra note 63.
140 Cf. Cahill & Malloy, supra note 124, at 139 ("By examining the specific state
program or service alleged to discriminate against the disabled, the Court may apply
a different level of scrutiny to the [S]tate's action than the rational basis scrutiny
that applied in Garrett.").
141 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (stating that "because the
[Family Medical and Leave Act] was targeted at sex-based classifications, which are
subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, 'it was easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations' than in Garrett or Kimel, both of
which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis
review" (citing Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735-37 (2003))); see
also James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: DisabilityDiscriminationClaims Against
State Entities Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct After Seminole Tribe and
Flores, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 686 (1999) (stating that "plaintiffs tend to prevail when
strict or heightened scrutiny is applied").
137
138

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:693

number of the Court's recent decisions addressing the issue of
state immunity. 142 In Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs,143 the Court reviewed a provision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993.144 Reiterating that classifications
based on gender were "subject to heightened scrutiny," 145 the
Court found that Congress had validly abrogated state
immunity.1 46 In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,1 47 the Court
held States immune from suits brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967148 because in the case
149
of age discrimination, only rational basis review applies.
Hence, Lane appears to be the most recent addition to the
Supreme Court's modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
setting forth a clear trend in how such cases are decided. In
Lane and Hibbs, where one of the higher forms of review applied,
the Court found a valid abrogation of state immunity in both
instances. In Kimel and Garrett, where rational basis review
applied, the Court upheld state immunity. Accordingly, a Title II
claim that alleges the violation of a fundamental right so as to
invoke review under strict scrutiny will not be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. 150
C. Moving Beyond Lane
The preceding section argued that a court will always find a
valid abrogation of state immunity when a claim brought under
Title II alleges the violation of a fundamental right. It is
suggested here that a claim under Title II's remedial legislation
will only prevail if it alleges the violation of a fundamental

142

See Cahill & Malloy, supranote 124, at 160-61.

143 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
144 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000). The Act gives eligible employees twelve
weeks of leave for every twelve month period for the birth of a child; for the
placement of child with the employee for adoption or foster care; to care for a spouse,
child, or parent with a serious health condition; and when the employee is unable to
perform his duties due to a serious health condition. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C).
145 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
146

See id. at 740.

147

528 U.S. 62 (2000).

148

See id. at 67.
See id. at 83.

149

150 Cf. Cahill & Malloy, supra note 124, at 139 ("Because the Lane case involves
a fundamental right, the Court should apply strict scrutiny when evaluating Title
II's congruence and proportionality.").
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right. 151 Lane presented the Court with an opportunity to decide
whether States were immune from all Title II claims; however, it
declined to do so. 152 The Court made it clear that its holding only
applied to the fundamental right of access to the courts. 153 The
issue as to whether Title II can be used in suits alleging the
denial of state services and programs that do not implicate the
violation of a fundamental right has yet to be decided. The Court
mentioned the unavailability of access to a state-owned hockey
rink as an example of this type of claim. 5 4 By applying the
three-step analysis to claims of this type, it appears that
Congress did not validly abrogate state immunity.
1. Hypothetical State Immunity Challenge to Title II Claim
Under Rational Basis Review Using the Supreme Court's
Analyses in Garrettand Lane
a. Step One: Identifying the Right at Issue
Title II of the ADA was enacted to protect fundamental
rights and ensure equal protection of disabled Americans. 155 As
a result, a claim under Title II that does not implicate the
violation of a fundamental right, such as the Court's equal access
to a hockey rink example, would be subject to rational basis
review, as the disabled are not a protected class under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 56 Thus, like the Title I claim in
Garrett,Title II claims based on equal protection will not stand if
157
a State's failure to make accommodations is rational.

151 See id. at 162 ("For the Supreme Court to find that Title II is a valid exercise
of Congress' Section 5 authority, a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis
appears to be a necessity.").
152 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
153 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
154 See id. at 530-31.
155 See id. at 522 ("Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce [the] prohibition [ofi
irrational disability discrimination. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other

basic constitutional guarantees ..

").

Cf. Alison Tanchyk, Comment, An Eleventh Amendment Victory: The
Eleventh Amendment vs. Title II of the ADA, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 675, 696, 700 (2002)
(stating that "disabled individuals enjoy no special rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment" and therefore "state actions discriminating against the disabled are
not unconstitutional as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest").
157 See supra note 69 (explaining the level of court scrutiny for claims based on
discrimination against the disabled).
156
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b. Step Two: Determining Whether CongressIdentified a History
and Pattern of States Denying Services and Programsto
Persons with Disabilities
It appears that there is a sufficient history and pattern of
discrimination against the disabled in the area of state services
and programs to satisfy the second step in the congruence and
proportionality test. In Lane, the Court did not appear to limit
its inquiry to the denial of access to the courts. 158 Much of the
Court's language in this step of the analysis addressed the
history and pattern of discrimination in state services and
programs generally. 159 The Court noted, for example, that
Congress's evidence of discrimination against the disabled
included "hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons
with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions," and
that "the 'overwhelming majority' of these examples concerned
discrimination in the administration of public programs and
services." 160 Additionally, as noted above, the Court identified
the "sheer volume" of proof of discrimination based on disability
with respect to public services and programs.1 61 Moreover,
Congress's findings in the text of the ADA indicated that the
disabled faced discrimination in the area of "'access to public
services.'"162 Therefore, Congress has provided a history and
pattern of state discrimination against the disabled in the area of
163
public services.
Lane's effect on the application of step two of the congruence
and proportionality test is currently being played out in the lower
courts. A number of courts, including the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits, have concluded that the Supreme Court essentially
decided in Lane that Title II as a whole passes step two of the

158 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524 ("Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of
pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs,
including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.") (emphasis added).
159 See id. at 526.
160 Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371
n.7 (2001)).
161 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
162 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 529 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(3) (2000)).
163 But see Tanchyk, supra note 156, at 697 ("The ADA legislative record
summarizing [Congress's] findings of discrimination against the disabled is simply
not sufficient to support the abrogation of the [S]tates' Eleventh Amendment
protection.").
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test.164 In a case addressing the right to education, the Eastern
District of New York limited the step two inquiry to a history and
pattern of state discrimination with respect to education, but still
found that this part of the test was satisfied. 165 The Southern
District of New York, however, in a case addressing state
discrimination against applicants seeking admission to the New
York State Bar, limited its inquiry to a history and pattern of
state discrimination of bar applicants, and found that there was
insufficient proof of such discrimination. 166 Still, it seems as
though the Supreme Court's decision in Lane is influencing some
lower courts to find that there is a history and pattern of state
discrimination with respect to Title II, regardless of the level
scrutiny applicable. It is posited here, however, that the level of
scrutiny will be the decisive factor for claims under rational basis
review at step three of congruence and proportionality test.
c. Step Three: Determining Whether Title II is an Appropriate
Response to the History and Patternof States Denying Services
and Programsto Persons with Disabilities
Given the Supreme Court's analysis in both Garrett and
Lane, it appears that if the Court were to decide whether Title II
was an appropriate response to discrimination in the realm of
state services and programs, other than instances invoking the
violation of a fundamental right or an "actual" constitutional
violation, it would find Title II to be disproportionate to the
harms it sought to prevent. In Lane, the Court noted that Title
II requires States to make reasonable modifications so as to
ensure that disabled persons have access to services and
programs. 67 Under the agency rules promulgated to carry out
the intent of Congress, this entails spending for either structural

164 See Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th
Cir. 2005) (confirming the Lane Court's finding that the "sufficient historical
predicate of unconstitutional disability discrimination" is satisfied when Title II is
considered as a whole); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ.,
411 F.3d 474, 487 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that the enactment of Title II on its face
satisfies an inquiry as to a history and pattern of unconstitutional disability
discrimination by States); Buchanan v. Maine, 377 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281 (D. Me.
2005) ("Lane ruled that the [step two] inquiry was satisfied generally as applied to
the ADA ....).
165 See Press v. State Univ. of N.Y., 388 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
166 See Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
167 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000)).
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changes or other means that guarantee equal access. 168 In this
instance the scope of the protection is limited to rational basis
review, 169 so Title II would not be an appropriate response if a
State's refusal to make modifications was rational. 170 In Garrett,
the Court stated that even if there had been a history and
pattern of employment discrimination, Title I would have failed
this portion of the test because the decision by a state employer
not to hire a disabled person in an effort to "conserve scarce
financial resources" would be "entirely rational."'171 Using the
same reasoning, it would be rational for States to refuse to make
modifications for disabled individuals if doing so would save
money.172 It appears then that the Court would likely find Title
II to be a disproportionate response to the denial of state services
and programs to disabled Americans in cases like the hockey rink
example.
2. The Lower Courts' Interpretation of Lane
The issue as to the constitutionality of Title II when subject
to rational basis review will remain clouded until the Supreme
Court decides to rule on the question. In the meantime, the
lower courts have been wrestling with the issue, attempting to
interpret Lane's effect on Title II. It seems that the courts have
in fact come out on both sides of the issue, but tend to favor state
immunity.
A number of courts have limited Lane to cases involving
either access to the courts or fundamental rights. 173 A couple of
168 See id. at 532 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(b)(1), 35.151 (2005)).
169 See supra Part IV.C.I.a (noting the level of scrutiny).
170 Cf. Cahill & Malloy, supra note 124, at 173 ("A case involving access to a
hockey rink would likely come out very differently than a case involving denial of a
more fundamental right, like access to voting booths or a courthouse.").

See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
Cf. Tanchyk, supra note 156, at 700 (2002) ("From a practical standpoint, it
makes sense not to impose expansive accommodation requirements on the [S]tates
because individuals can be afflicted with a huge variety of disabilities.").
173 See Bill M. v. Neb. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Fin. & Support, 408 F.3d
1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (construing Lane as a "discrete application of Title II
abrogation" and stating that "[o]ther applications of Title II abrogation" must fail);
Press v. State Univ. of N.Y., 388 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that
the Supreme Court was "unwilling to expand the scope of Title II and encroach on
the [S]tate's immunity with respect to a non-fundamental right such as access to
post-secondary education that is subject only to rational review"); Buchanan v.
Maine, 377 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (D. Me. 2005) ("Absent a fundamental right, based
on the law as it has been developed to date, Title II is not a proportional or
171
172
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courts have denied claims based on healthcare-related services
on such grounds. In Bill M. v. Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services Finance and Support,174 the Eight Circuit,
addressing the denial of Medicaid services, declined to overrule
its pre-Lane decision in Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 175 which
found that Congress failed to abrogate state immunity with
respect to Title 11.176 Instead, the court found that Lane was
limited to cases addressing access to the courts.' 77 In Buchanan
v. Maine,178 the District Court of Maine went even further,
implying that a claim based on discrimination with respect to
mental health services was barred by state immunity because the
179
claim failed to invoke a fundamental right.
The court in Buchanan reviewed post-Lane cases addressing
state immunity and found that, at the time, the "case law (with
one exception) caution[ed] against abrogating a [SItate's
sovereign immunity as to Title II... unless a plaintiff is
asserting a fundamental right."'8 0 The one exception was Ass'n
for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Florida International
18 2
It
University,'8 l which addressed the right to education.
appears that the issue as to whether Title II is an appropriate
response to discrimination with respect to administering
education is one exception where the lower courts are less willing
to find state immunity, even when rational basis review applies.
The right to education is currently at the forefront of Title II
litigation. In the context of state immunity challenges, the right
to education is a particularly interesting issue post-Lane because
it has not been deemed a fundamental right. 8 3 In Ass'n for
Disabled Americans, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a state
congruent response to the recognized history of disability discrimination for mental
health services."); Johnson v. S. Conn. State Univ., No. 3:02-CV-2065 (CFD), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21084, at *13 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) ("[I]n the wake of Lane, it
appears that a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA may be
maintained against a [S]tate only if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II

violation involved a fundamental right.").
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

408 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2005).
184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999).
Bill M., 408 F.3d at 1099-100.

See id. at 1100.
377 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Me. 2005).
See id. at 283.
Id.
405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 957.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973).
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immunity defense to a Title II claim for discrimination in the
context of equal access to education. 184 The plaintiffs sued a
university for failing to provide services such as sign language
interpreters, auxiliary aids, and note takers. 185 Applying step
one of the congruence and proportionality test, the court noted
that although the right to education is only subject to rational
basis review, the "'importance of education'" to society and the
individual "distinguishes public education from other rights
subject to rational basis review." 186 Moreover, the harm involved
is one that is "vast and far reaching." 187 Turning to step two, the
court found that the Supreme Court had decided that there was a
history and pattern of state discrimination with respect claims
under Title 11.188 At the third and final step, the court adopted
the "as applied" method, and found Title II to be an appropriate
response to state discrimination as applied to education because
the Act seeks to remedy a "long history" of such discrimination
and any modifications required would be limited to being
189
reasonable.
The Fourth Circuit has since come to the same conclusion in
Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason
University.190 At step one, the court acknowledged that the right
to education was subject to rational basis review.1 91 At step two,
the court stated that after Lane it was "settled" that there was a
history and pattern of discrimination by the States in the area of
public services. 192 At the third step, the court considered Title
II's appropriateness to the "cases implicating the right to be free
from irrational disability discrimination in public higher
education."1 93 In finding Title II to be an appropriate response to
discrimination with respect to education, the court first discussed
the harm that Title II sought to remedy, discrimination on the
basis of disability, and found that Title II's mandate of

See Ass'n for DisabledAms., 405 F.3d at 959.
See id. at 956.
186 See id. at 957 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
187 Id. at 957-58 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
184
185

188 See id. at 958.
189 See id. at 958-59.
190411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005).

191 See id. at 486.
192
193

See id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
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reasonable modification addressed such discrimination. 194 The
court then noted the limitations of Title II and the regulations
that govern its enforcement, such as the limitation that
modifications be reasonable. 95 In distinguishing the case from
Garrett, the Constantinecourt argued that Title II does not pose
the same "congruence-and-proportionality concerns" as Title I
based on two grounds. 96 First, States have a greater interest in
achieving their goals in an efficient manner when acting as
employers than when acting as sovereigns. 197 Second, the court
found Title II's remedies to be "less burdensome" because Title II,
unlike Title I, does not impose a "categorical requirement" of
reasonable modifications, but in fact has specific limitations.1 98
The court acknowledged that Title II "may not be a perfect fit" for
the discrimination Congress sought to remedy, but stated that
the issue was not whether Title II exceeded "the boundaries of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but by how much."1 99 The court
concluded that Title II was constitutional as applied to the right
to education because it was not " 'so out of proportion.' "200
Despite the decisions from the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
under the analysis set forth above, courts are likely to find that
Title II is invalid with respect to the right to education based on
the fact that the right is limited to rational basis review. 20 1 The
argument was put forth in Press v. State University of New
York. 20 2 The court appears to have been heavily influenced by
20 3
the fact that the right to education is not fundamental.
Admittedly, the court's decision seemed to lack a complete
analysis of the congruence and proportionality test. It held,
however, that without the application of strict scrutiny, Title II,
20 4
as applied to access to education, is "an abuse of. . . power."
Thus, in the absence of a fundamental right, the court found Title
II claims against the States to be invalid.

194

See id.

195 See id. at 488-89.
196
197

See id. at 489.
See id. at 489-90.

198 See id. at 490.
199 See id.
200
201
202
203
204

See id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
See supra Part IV.C.I.a (analyzing Title II).
388 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
See id. at 133-34.
See id. at 134.
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V. THE STRENGTH OF THE ADA TODAY
Although Garrett and Lane together may be viewed as a
trend in limiting the rights of disabled Americans in suits
against the States and a weakening of the ADA as a whole, there
are other avenues of recourse open to the disabled. With respect
to discrimination by the States, disabled Americans still have
two ways of seeking redress. First, as noted above, plaintiffs may
seek injunctive relief against state officials. 20 5 Under Ex parte
Young,20 6 parties may seek such prospective injunctive relief
when federal law is being violated. 20 7 Second, the doctrine of
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only to the States, and
thus does not apply to municipalities. 20 8 This is so despite the
20 9
fact that municipalities, to some extent, exercise state power.
A municipality can therefore be sued for money damages under
the ADA. In sum, there are alternate avenues to seek redress for
discrimination by the States.
The ADA also continues to protect persons with disabilities
to the extent that it addresses constitutional violations. In the
recent decision of United States v. Georgia,210 the Supreme Court
held that Title II was valid to the extent it sought to protect
against "conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment." 21 1 The case was decided in the context of the
rights of prisoners. 212 There, the plaintiff, an inmate with
2 13
disabilities, sought money damages from the State of Georgia.
The plaintiff asserted a number of claims for cruel and unusual
punishment based on the Eighth Amendment, and argued that
the bases for such claims were also actionable under Title II of
the ADA. 214 As the Due Process Clause in Section 1 of the
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
207 See id. at 155-56; see also Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
225 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000)).
208 See Lake Country Estates, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 401 (1979) ("[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to
afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities .....
205

206

209

See id.

210

126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).

211

See id. at 882.
See id. at 879.
See id.

212
213

214 See id. at 880-81. The plaintiff, Tony Goodman, was confined to a small
room in which he was unable to turn his wheelchair. See id. at 879. Additionally, he
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Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the protections of the
215
Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment,
the Court noted that the plaintiffs ADA claims contained
allegations that "independently violated ... the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 16 This means that the plaintiff claimed "actual"
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and no analysis of the
congruence and proportionality of remedial legislation based on
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like those at issue in
Garrett and Lane, would be required. 217 The distinction is critical
because damages are a constitutional remedy for "actual"
violations. 218 Accordingly, the Court unanimously held that Title
II was valid "insofar as [it] creates a private cause of action for
damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment." 219
Thus, after United States v.
Georgia, it is clear that constitutional violations brought
pursuant to Title II will withstand a state immunity challenge.
CONCLUSION

It has been a long and arduous struggle for persons with
disabilities to attain equal membership in society.
The
Americans with Disabilities Act was intended to be the final step
in the movement to secure the rights of disabled Americans.
Congress enacted Title II of the ADA to safeguard persons with
disabilities from denials of state services and programs. It
appears, however, that Congress may have overstepped its
bounds by creating a general right to sue States for money
damages under Title II. After Tennessee v. Lane, it seems that
the only claims brought under Title II's remedial provisions that
will survive a challenge of state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment are those that allege the violation of a fundamental
right.

alleged lack of access to facilities, such as a shower and toilet, and to prison

programs, such as physical therapy and medical treatment. See id.
215 See id. at 881 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947)).
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 882.
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